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CREDIBILITY AND CHARACTER: 
A DIFFERENT LOOK AT AN INTERMINABLE PROBLEM 
Robert G. Lawson* 
1. Introduction 
Early in this century, Wigmore made the following statement about the use 
of character as a predictor of testimonial credibility: 
From the point of view of modern psychology the moral disposition 
which tends for or against falsehood is an elusive quality. Its intermittent 
operation in connection with other tendencies, and the difficulty of ascer-
taining its quality and force, make it by no means a feature peculiarly reli-
able in the diagnosis of testimonial credit. Hence, to the psychologist, the 
common law's reliance on character as an index of falsehood is crude and 
childish.]. 
Nonetheless, he added, "the crude belief of the common law must . . . hold its 
place until science provides a better method."2 In 1969 a committee of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States proposing rules of evidence for use in 
United States courts, stated that there was still no "acceptable alternative" to 
the law's treatment of character.s The committee then proposed rules that 
adopted almost all of the common law doctrine which Wigmore, decades earlier, 
had described as "crude and childish." Then in 1972 the Supreme Court con-
curred in the committee's judgment when it promulgated the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.4 In more than fifty years, it might be said, the law progressed from 
nowhere to nowhere. 
Yet, despite this action by the highest judicial authority in the country, 
there emerged a brisk and critical appraisal of this important and troublesome 
area of evidence law. The provisions in the rules that dealt with character and 
credibility attracted swift and piercing criticism. They were characterized by 
one writer as "a half step forward and three steps backward"5 and by another 
as "a mere mediocre reorganization of worn out concepts."6 The most significant 
criticism, however, was leveled by a federal judge who had only shortly before 
authored what many consider the most progressive judicial pronouncement on 
character evidence in many years.7 Referring to the considerations which led 
to the proposals, he said: 
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
1 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 922 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited a.!l 
WIGMORE]. 
2. Id. 
3 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts 
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 299 (1969). 
4 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules]. 
5 Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by his Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 LOYOLA U.L.J. 247 
(1970) . 
6 Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed 
Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 GRIM. L. BULL. 330,331 (1970). 
7 McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 LAw & 
SOCIAL ORDER 1. He labeled the most prominent part of the proposed character rules as "an 
unfortunate step backwards" and a "dead end." Id. at 12, 15. 
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With all respect, it appears fair to say that the Committee [Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence] has, in express terms at least, 
failed to come to grips with the merits of the Model Code and Uniform RuIe 
treatment of this perplexing problem. Those merits, or lack of them, turn 
upon answers to infinitely more searching questions than the Committee 
purports to have asked itself.s 
The impact of this and similar criticism was considerable, although, as matters 
ultimately developed, almost totally transitory in nature. A substantial review 
of the original character provisions occurred in the judiciary committees of Con-
gress. As a product of that review, significant changes in those provisions were 
proposed in response to the criticism of the original proposals.9 However, Con-
gress rejected most of these revisions, enacting character rules nearly identical 
to the ones originally submitted by the Supreme Court. 
The problems of character evidence "resolved" by the new Federal Rules 
are problems that involve the structure of human personality. The judgmental 
processing by jurors of character information involves a behavioral transaction 
called interpersonal perception. Each of these psychological problems has been 
intensively investigated for nearly 40 years. As the character problems of the 
law now take on the appearance of having been solved, there is not the slightest 
indication that the results of this scientific endeavor influenced the choices made 
by the law. The solutions to these problems composed by the Judicial Conference 
and embraced by the Supreme Court and Congress are grounded exclusively on 
supposed common sense and naive psychological thought. The persevering 
thought and creative imagination that typically accompany legal judgments do 
not appear in the intellectual effort underneath the new character rules. As a 
consequence, to defend its action the law has only Wigmore's claim that science 
has not yet provided an acceptable alternative to its own intuitive judgment 
about human personality. It is time to investigate the validity of that claim; 
this article initiates such an inquiry. 
II. Character Evidence Law: A Brief Survey 
A. Relevancy 
To lawyers and judges, credibility is a two-dimensional concept. One im-
plies the possibility of mistake or unintentional misrepresentation, the other a 
deliberate and corrupt misstatement of truth. The rules of character evidence, 
of course, deal only with the latter. As Wigmore stated, they are concerned 
with the "moral disposition which tends for or against falsehood."10 The most 
fundamental difficulty posed for the law in its struggle to make use of this human 
tendency is the evidentiary concept of "relevancy." What is the precise nature 
of the mental quality that is predictive of the testimonial behavior of witnesses? 
Wigmore provided the most sensible answer to this question: 
8 !d. at 12. 
9 See H.R. REp. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1973). 
10 WIGMORE § 922. 
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[I]t is obvious that the quality or tendency which will here aid is his
[the witness's] quality or tendency as to truth-telling in general, i.e., his
veracity, or, as more commonly and more loosely put, his character for
truth. This must be, and is universally conceded to be, the immediate basis
of inference. Character for truth is always and everywhere admissible."
Unfortunately, the law has not related relevancy to credibility in such elementary
terms.
In the law the psychic quality that would lead a witness to testify truthfully
or untruthfully is believed to be highly elusive and, more importantly, inter-
mingled in some way with other moral aspects of personality. As a consequence,
the law views "general moral character" to be relevant to testimonial credibility,
having the following evidential value:
The argument for the use of bad general character to discredit a wit-
ness is, in brief, that it necessarily involves an impairment of the truth-telling
capacity, that to show general moral degeneration is to show an inevitable
degeneration in veracity, and that the former is often more easily betrayed
to observation than the latter.'2
In other words, the use of general moral character to reflect on credibility is
based on a belief that individual units of personality are highly integrated and
exert themselves pervasively across diverse situations. Not all jurisdictions hold
that general moral character satisfies the requirement of relevancy." The psy-
chological assumption upon which it is based, however, has played a dominant,
though inadequately recognized, role in the overall development of character
doctrine. That role will become apparent in the following discussion of methods
by which relevant traits of character are evidenced.
B. Methods of Proof
In the development of character principles, the law has consciously main-
tained a distinction between two types of facts, the "factum probanda" or ulti-
mate fact, and the "factum probans" or evidentiary fact. The discussion of
relevancy concerned the ultimate facts of character, the mental dispositions con-
sidered to have the necessary logical relationship to credibility. The law has
experienced no less difficulty in its efforts to deal with the evidentiary facts of
character doctrine. The following have been considered potential sources for
proving traits of character: (1) particular instances of conduct of a witness;
(2) the personal knowledge or opinion of someone who has observed him; and
(3) his reputation in the community.' The law's choice from among these
possibilities need not be extensively discussed here. It is common knowledge that
character witnesses must present their testimony in the form of community repu-
tation. 5 They are not allowed to express personal opinions about character, nor
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1940).
14 WIGMORE § 920.
15 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDNCE § 44 (2d ed. 1972).
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to report particular instances of good or bad conduct that might bear on credi-
bility.
There are two exceptions to the general prohibition against the use of par-
ticular acts, two instances in which specific misconduct may be introduced to
reflect adversely on a witness's credibility. The least known and least significant
allows the use of such information if elicited through cross-examination of the
witness being impeached."6 The other has served as the source for most of the
controversy involving character and credibility. This universally recognized
exception authorizes the impeachment of a witness through proof of misconduct
that resulted in a criminal conviction.17 The dispute over the use of this kind
of information and the two principal resolutions of that dispute are suggested in
this statement:
There is little dissent from the general proposition that at least some
crimes are relevant to credibility but much disagreement among the cases
and commentators about which crimes are usable for this purpose.... The
weight of traditional authority has been to allow use of felonies generally,
without regard to the nature of the particular offense, and of crimen fatsi
without regard to the grade of the offense.... Uniform Rule 21 and Model
Code Rule 106 permit only crimes involving "dishonesty or false state-
ment."1 s
The view identified as "weighted" authority is based on a belief that proof of
commission of a serious crime establishes a "general readiness to do evil" from
which it is possible to infer "a readiness to lie in the particular case."1 The Uni-
form Rules and Model Code view is based on a judgment that the determinative
factor should not be the gravity of the crime underlying a conviction but its
logical relationship to the character trait of veracity.2" It should be obvious that
the foundation of the first and prevailing view is the psychological assumption
mentioned in connection with the discussion of "general moral character." Since
personality is presumed to be fully integrated in its moral aspects, it is presumed
to function indiscriminately in directing moral behavior across diverse situations.
C. Credibility of a Criminal Defendant
Once a criminal defendant chooses to testify, he is no different from other
witnesses. His testimony is subject to full scrutiny by the state; his credibility
may be attacked through the use of character evidence. Specifically, the pros-
ecution may do two things to reflect adversely on his character, though the pre-
cise nature of each varies somewhat among jurisdictions. In all jurisdictions it
may be shown that the defendant possesses a community reputation for untruth-
fulness; in a few it may be shown that he has a reputation for bad moral char-
acter in general. Additionally, it may be shown that prior to his testimony he
engaged in particular acts of misconduct resulting in subsequent convictions.
16 WGMOR § 981.
17 Id. § 980.
18 Proposed Rules supra note 4, at 270.
19 Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
20 Glick, supra note 6, at 337.
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In a few jurisdictions such acts are admissible only if they involve an element of
dishonesty or falsehood; but in most they may be introduced if the offenses
underlying the convictions are classified as felonies.
The apparent ease with which these principles may be applied to a criminal
defendant is misleading. The law has experienced special difficulty in its efforts
to use a defendant's character to predict his testimonial behavior. Despite
general claims to the contrary, a criminal defendant is not and cannot be like
other witnesses. He is the purpose of the proceeding, its target and its center
of gravity. He is the accused, a role that brings into operation an additional
set of rules to govern the admissibility of character evidence. These principles,
commonly referred to as "substantive" character rules, differ fundamentally
from the principles that deal with credibility. Their main thrust is more exclu-
sionary in nature.
They begin with a general prohibition against the use of "bad" character
to prove the commission of a criminal act. The underlying reason is the possi-
bility of prejudice against an accused. Bad character by itself, it is said, "may
be thought by the jury to deserve punishment or to deprive an erroneous verdict
of its moral injustice."'" Therefore the state cannot use evidence otherwise con-
sidered relevant and probative. This denial, however, is provisional. Evidence
of character is fully admissible to prove the absence of commission of a criminal
act. But if a defendant elects to defend himself in this way-by proving that he
is a man of "good" character-the prohibition against the state is lifted and
evidence of "bad" character becomes equally admissible. Without this penalty,
says Wigmore, "a defendant, secure from refutation, would have too clear a
license unscrupulously to impose a false character upon the tribunal."2 2 Once
the prosecution is provided an opportunity to take advantage of this "penalty,"
evidence of the defendant's bad character must consist of community reputation.
Because they are considered to pose a special danger of prejudice, particular acts
of misconduct are not admissible under this set of rules even if they resulted in
criminal convictions.23
It is common knowledge that the attempt to correlate the "substantive"
rules with the "credibility" rules involves a major difficulty. Suppose a defendant
with a criminal record elects to testify in his own defense. Evidence of his prior
conviction is inadmissible to prove commission of the act for which he is charged.
Yet it is admissible to reflect adversely on his credibility. The difficulty involved
in this conflict is not fully reflected in the treatment it is accorded by the law.
Juries are permitted to hear the evidence and then simply told that it must be
used exclusively to reflect on the defendant's credibility. Occasionally, a court
or writer will condemn this solution as unrealistic,24 but most of the time the
problem is conveniently ignored. Only recently has there been a significant effort
21 WIGMORE § 921.
22 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 58 (3d ed. 1940).
23 Id. §§ 193-94.
24 United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574, 576 (3rd Cir. 1960) ("[A] ritualistic counsel
of psychologically impossible behavior.") Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021
(1965). ("Juries are solemnly instructed to this effect. Is there anyone who doubts what the
effect of this evidence is on the jury?")
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to do more than pretend that a simplistic instruction on "credibility" is sufficient
to insure proper use of such information.
That effort began with Judge McGowan's opinion in Luck v. United
States." Charged with house breaking and larceny, the defendant offered an
alibi defense and elected to take the witness stand to support it. Solely for the
purpose of reflecting on credibility, the prosecution was permitted to intro-
duce evidence of a prior conviction for grand larceny. The defendant was con-
victed but the conviction was reversed on appeal for reasons not connected with
the use of this evidence. The Court of Appeals, however, made significant pro-
nouncements about the impeachment of a defendant through prior felony con-
victions. They were subsequently summarized by the writer of the Luck opinion
in these words:
It seemed to me that neither the letter nor the apparent purpose of the
statute [i.e., a District of Columbia law that authorized impeachment by use
of criminal convictions] compelled this result. Thus, the court in Luck
observed that: (1) 'The trial court is not required to allow impeachment
by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own de-
fense"; (2) the statute "leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial
discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular
case"; and (3) there may be circumstances "where the trial judge might
think that the cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear
the defendant's story than by the defendant's foregoing that opportunity
because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction." 26
Thus, the impact of prior convictions on a defendant's election to testify in his
own defense seems to have been the court's major concern. Language from the
opinion itself reveals a broader concern, one directed primarily at the possibility
of improper use of such evidence by juries. The important contribution of this
decision to character doctrine, however, was its suggestion that the law should
not allow the automatic use of convictions, but only in the exercise of "sound
judicial discretion." This idea has gained the Luck case recognition as a "revolu-
tionary" step,2" a "landmark decision,"2 and "the most practical method for
balancing the interests of both prosecutor and defense.' 29 Despite such acclaim
the reception given Luck by other jurisdictions has been mixed.0
D. The Federal Rules
As finally adopted by the Supreme Court, the federal rules applicable to
character evidence contained few notable departures from prevailing doctrine.
With respect to the use of such evidence for reflecting on credibility, the rules:
(1) recognized character as an appropriate technique for supporting or attack-
25 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
26 McGowan, supra note 7, at 3.
27 Peltz, More Than a Matter of Luck, 19 N.Y.L.F. 833, 837 (1974).
28 Glick, supra note 6, at 339.
29 Spector, supra note 5, at 253.
30 See, e.g., Nance v. State, 7 Md. App. 433, 256 A.2d 377 (1969); State v. Hawthorne,
49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967); United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1968).
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ing the testimony of a witness; 3' (2) prohibited the rehabilitation of a witness
through use of character until after his impeachment;32 (3) required that evi-
dence of character be put in the form of "reputation" or "opinion" ; 3 and (4)
prohibited the use of specific instances of conduct to prove character.3 4 The two
long-standing exceptions to this latter prohibition were incorporated into the
proposals. Specific conduct was treated as a proper subject of inquiry through
cross-examination, 5 and particular acts of misconduct were recognized as a
legitimate basis of impeachment if supported by an appropriate criminal con-
viction."
In one sense the Supreme Court rules adopted a narrow approach to the
issue of relevancy. Veracity or truthfulness was recognized as the only trait of
character possessing the necessary logical relationship to credibility. Evidence
of "reputation" and "opinion" had to be in reference to "character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness. 1 7 The same limitation was imposed on the right to
inquire into particular acts on cross-examination. Such acts were required to
be "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness."38 With respect to the use of
criminal convictions, however, the rules adopted a very broad definition of rele-
vancy. They allowed for the impeachment of a witness through proof of mis-
conduct that resulted in any felony conviction or in any misdemeanor conviction
for an offense involving an element of dishonesty or false statement.3
As applied to a criminal defendant, the Supreme Court proposals contained
a general prohibition against the use of character to prove commission of a crim-
inal act.4" If an accused elected to defend himself by showing his "good" char-
acter, countervailing proof could be offered in the form of "reputation" or "opin-
ion."'" Particular acts could not be used for this purpose, except through inquiry
on cross-examination.42 In his capacity as a witness a criminal defendant was
given no special consideration. Reputation or opinion as to character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, inquiry through cross-examination about specific acts
of conduct probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, and evidence of appro-
priate criminal convictions were all treated as proper techniques for reflecting
on his credibility. Despite a provision in the rules authorizing exclusion of rele-
vant evidence considered to be prejudicial,43 the character provisions left no room
for application of the Luck doctrine. The drafters' commentary was very specific
in this regard: "In the absence of an acceptable alternative, the rule adheres to
the traditional practice of allowing the witness-accused to be impeached by evi-





36 Id. at 269.
37 Id. at 267.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 269.
40 Id. at 219.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 218.
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dence of conviction of crime, like other witnesses."4 In simple terms the treat-
ment accorded a criminal defendant by the Supreme Court character proposals
contained very little, if anything, new.
As indicated in the introduction, the character provisions of the Federal
Rules were subjected to extensive review in the judiciary committees of Congress.
The House committee made two important changes in the rules submitted by
the Court. It eliminated the ability of litigants to prove traits of character by
use of opinion evidence 5 and, more significantly, it modified the provision which
allowed impeachment of witnesses by use of criminal convictions. 6 Under the
modification "only convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement
[could] be used as impeachment material." 7 The Senate Judiciary Committee
proposed still another version of this impeachment rule, one that provided for a
more limited use of criminal convictions when the witness being impeached was
an accused. Any felony conviction and any other conviction for an offense in-
volving dishonesty or false statement would be admissible to impeach an ordinary
witness, but only the latter could be used to impeach a criminal defendant. 8
Ultimately this extensive congressional review of the original character
proposals was not very productive. The law finally enacted 9 restored the right
of litigants to prove character traits by use of opinion evidence,"0 rejected both
judiciary committees' modification of the impeachment rule, and provided the
following instead:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.-"
In only one important way does this rule differ from the one proposed by the
Supreme Court. With the phrase "and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,"
Congress appears to have adopted the Luck doctrine, limiting its application,
however, to criminal convictions that have no element of dishonesty or false
statement.
44 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 299 (1969).
45 The reason for this change was explained as follows:
Rule 405 (a) as submitted proposed to change existing law by allowing evidence
of character in the form of opinion as well as reputation testimony. Fearing, among
other reasons, that wholesale allowance of opinion testimony might tend to turn a
trial into a swearing contest between conflicting character witnesses, the Committee
decided to delete from this Rule, as well as from Rule 608 (a) which involves a related
problem, reference to opinion testimony.
H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
46 H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
47 Peltz, supra note 27, at 840.
48 S. RzP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
49 Pub. L. N. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
50 Id. at Rules 405, 608.




This article investigates from a scientific perspective the law of character
evidence as applied to testimonial credibility. The discussion is divided into
three parts. The first has consisted of a description of the legal doctrine used to
control the admissibility of such evidence. It is not exhaustive but instead seeks
to provide an adequate frame of reference for discussion of relevant scientific
data. The description provided allows for a fruitful discussion of the usefulness
of psychological findings and conceptualizations to a proper appraisal of legal
problems surrounding character and credibility. The next two parts of the
article will be directed toward that end. The first part will focus on problems
involving the impact of character evidence on jurors. The last will center on a
more critical matter-the evidential value of character as a predictor of testi-
monial credibility.
III. Character Evidence and Interpersonal Perception
A. Introduction
What is the impact of character evidence on the judgmental processes of
judicial decision makers? No appraisal of the legal doctrine of character and
credibility is complete without consideration of this question. Attention will
therefore center on the "image" of character or, stated differently, on the ways
in which character is perceived and used in a decision process. Behavioral scien-
tists have long recognized this as an important area of psychological inquiry.
Consequently, a great deal is known about the processes by which impressions of
others are formed and about some of the features of these processes that distort
and falsify judgments about others.
The objective is to use this knowledge to consider the following questions:
(1) Does character evidence have the kind of influence on testimonial appeal that
the law assumes it has? (2) Does it influence the persuasiveness of testimony
in ways that are neither anticipated nor desirable? (3) Is it possible for jurors
in a criminal trial to use evidence of an accused's character exclusively for the
purpose of evaluating his testimonial credibility? (4) Is there a significant risk
that evidence of a defendant's character serves to distort the decision in criminal
cases? While this discussion will revolve primarily around the character evidence
that has caused the greatest controversy in the law-proof of prior criminal con-
victions-most of the scientific material involved in the discussion is equally ap-
plicable to other types of character information.
B. Testimonial Influences of Character
1. Anticipated Influences
The manner in which jurors are instructed to use evidence of character
for its effect on "credibility" only has already been described. The nature of
these instructions reveals the law's expectations concerning the use of character
[June 19751
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data. At the very least, it shows that credibility, in its relationship to character,
is considered one dimensional, synonymous with "trustworthiness," and so simple
that jurors can be expected to measure it properly without much guidance. The
total lack of complexity believed to be involved in this aspect of decision making
is glaringly manifested in the use of criminal convictions to impeach. Jurors
are expected to receive information about a witness's prior criminal act, infer
from that act that he is an untruthful person, and then conclude that his testimony
about the event in question may not be believable. Two assumpions of psycho-
logical importance are implicit in this expectation, neither of which has ever been
critically appraised in the law. One involves the process of perception, the other
a reaction to a perceptual act.
The first assumption is that ordinary people will use a fragment of be-
havioral information about another to infer the existence of a general behavioral
disposition. Scientific evaluations of interpersonal perception confirm the validity
of this supposition.52 A person who receives information about another's conduct
does more than simply register or record that data. His interpretation of it goes
substantially beyond an adequate explanation of the action itself. As an observer
he cannot avoid mental activities that extend beyond the circumstances observed
and impose on the actor personal responsibility for his action. There is no disagree-
ment among psychologists about the existence of this psychological process. As
one writer has stated succinctly, "an actor's deviance is seen to prompt dis-
positional inferences that far transcend the situational context.""3 Consequently,
jurors no doubt perceive information about a witness's prior criminal acts in
terms of his broad personal dispositions.
The law's assumption about jurors' reaction to this perceptual act involves
something research psychologists call "communicator prestige" or "communicator
credibility." Scientists have conducted extensive investigations of this subject,
and nearly every study has demonstrated that audience attitude toward a commu-
nicator correlates very highly with the effectiveness of his communication.5 4 As
52 S. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 206 (1952):
We think of people as kindly, irascible, happy; how do we discover these proper-
ties in them? . . .We saw earlier that one necessary step in coming to know others
is to perceive action as an effect produced by a person who functions as cause. When
act and person enter into cognitive unit-formation, the person takes on the quality
of his acts, just as the action of an object becomes a functional property of it. A
generous act alters our view of a person and endows him with a quality of generosity.
...We include in our view of happenings the latitude of action that the environ-
ment permits, and we assign to the individual responsibility for the particular selec-
tion he makes from among the environmental possibilities.
F. FROM, PERCEPTION OF OTHER PEOPLE 46 (1971):
Sometimes the perception of a single behavioral consequence may be decisive for
the way in which important traits in a person's character manifest themselves to us,
especially when the relevant product deviates from what we perceive as the typical
product.... If a man has committed a crime, many will perceive his personality in
terms of this one behavioral consequence.
53 Alexander & Epstein, Problems of Dispositional Inference in Person Perception Research,
32 SOCIOMETRY 381, 384 (1969).
54 E.g., C. HOVLA ND, I. JANIS & H. KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION 19
(1953); Manis, The Interpretation of Opinion Statements as a Function of Recipient Attitude
and Source Prestige, 63 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 82 (1961); Tannenbaum, Initial Atti-
tude Toward Source and Concept as Factors in Attitude Change Through Communication, 20
PUB. OPINION Q. 413 (1956); Hovland & Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Com-
munication Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635 (1951).
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one researcher stated recently, "experimental results have shown unequivocally
that there is a positive relationship between the credibility of the communicator
and the extent of opinion change" that is generated by his communication. 5
While none of these psychological investigations have closely paralleled the situa-
tion that exists in the courtroom, one study seems especially predictive of the
consequences of a witness's character on the persuasive appeal of his testimony.5 6
This study used a single tape-recorded communication advocating extreme
leniency in the treatment of juvenile delinquents. It was presented to three
separate audiences who were ostensibly to judge its educational value. The three
presentations differed only with respect to an introductory description of the
communicator. One audience was told that he was a juvenile judge, well-
informed, sincere, and honest; a second was told that he had been selected at
random, had been delinquent as a youth, and at the time of the communication
was charged with drug violations; and a third audience was told simply that the
communicator had been selected at random. The experimenters labeled these
introductions as "positive," "negative," and "neutral."57 The results of the ex-
periment were described as follows:
With identical content, audience judgments concerning the fairness of
the presentation were much more favorable when it was given by the posi-
tive communicator than by the negative one. The judgments for the neutral
communicator were intermediate but more similar to those for the positive
one ....The opinion results closely parallel the evaluations of the presenta-
tion .... [Tihe group hearing the communication from the positive source
favored more lenient treatment .. than those hearing it from the negative
source.
58
Two conclusions about the influence of character evidence may be drawn from
this finding: (1) Jury reaction to a witness's testimony is significantly influenced
by evidence of his character; and (2) evidence of good character will exert less
influence than evidence of bad character if both are measured from a neutral
position. Thus it is possible to conclude that the law is correct in its expectation
that character has a significant impact on the persuasive appeal of a witness's
testimony.
2. Unanticipated Influences
Is it possible that when jurors evaluate testimony they are influenced by
character in ways neither intended nor anticipated by the law? Might the
persuasiveness of a testimonial communication depend on variables other than
the one the law conceptualizes as "trustworthiness"? The importance of these
inquiries to the present discussion is suggested by the following statement:
55 Aronson, Turner & Carlsmith, Communicator Credibility and Communication Discrep-
ancy as Determinants of Opinion Change, 67 J. ABNORM. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 31 (1963).
56 See Kelnan & Hovland, "Reinstatement" of the Communicator in Delayed Measure-
ment of Opinion Change, 48 J. ABNORM. & SoC. PSYCHOL. 327 (1953).
57 See HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, supra note 54, at 31.
58 Id. at 32-33.
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Finally, an experiment by Aronson and Golden (1962) indicates that
not only are variables which are fully relevant to the content of the persua-
sive communication and which are also of general relevance (intelligence,
honesty, sincerity, responsibility) important in affecting attitude change, but
that those positive and negative aspects of a communicator that bear no
objective relevance to the topic of communication are also important. Both
relevant and irrelevant aspects of credibility determine change of attitude;
audiences are not composed of people who respond only to the objectively
relevant aspects of a communicator. Thus, for example, whether a person
is effective may depend on whether he is perceived as an expert, but also on
whether he is fat, sloppy, neat, ugly, handsome, a poor athlete, or a member
of a minority group.5 9
Psychologists frequently make general observations of this type,"0 which reflect a
widely held belief that the effectiveness of a communication is dependent in part
upon factors that have no verifiable relationship to the reliability of that com-
munication. These factors are "irrelevant aspects of credibility." To the extent
that they influence the persuasive appeal of a communication, they distort the
truth.
What does all this have to do with character doctrine? The ultimate answer
is probably dependent on research yet to be conducted. Psychologists have under-
taken a substantial investigation of the impact of "prestige" or "credibility" on
communication effectiveness which has now established beyond question the im-
portance of this factor; their research has recently directed its attention to the
problem of "disentangling the main components of credibility," 6' discovering the
reasons underlying the persuasion differential tied to communication source.
Unfortunately, this attempt to anatomize "credibility" has not yet progressed far
enough to reveal fully its most elemental parts. Still, enough research has been
done to demonstrate that: (1) the dimensions of credibility are considerably
more complex than imagined by the law, and (2) certain "irrelevant" credibility
factors might well be triggered by evidence of character. This is revealed most
pointedly by the findings of two particular studies of credibility.62
One was designed specifically to identify criteria used by individuals to
evaluate communication sources.6 1 It was concluded that the factor of credibility
has at least three dimensions, each consisting of numerous more elemental
components:
59 A. COHEN, ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAl INFLUENcE 28-29 (1964) (emphasis added).
60 Most of the time these observations are embraced in lengthy, general discussions of
communications and persuasion. See, e.g., HovLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, supra note 54, at 19-55;
A. COHEN, supra note 59, at 24-29. Only on occasion is a statement made with the specificity
of the one quoted above or of the following: "[O]ur reaction to the same verbal statement will
vary depending upon whether we judge the person making it to be reliable or unreliable, stable
or unstable, safe or dangerous, happy or sad, etc." Levy, Adaptation, Anchoring, and Dissipa-
tion in Social Perception, 29 J. PERSONALITY 94 (1961).
61 A. COHEN, supra note 59, at 26.
62 Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, Dimensions for Evaluating the Acceptability of Message
Sources, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 563 (1970); Kelman & Eagly, Attitude Toward the Communi-
cator, Perception of Communication Content, and Attitude Change, 1 J. PERs. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 63 (1965).
63 Berlo, Lemert & Mertz, supra note 62, at 565.
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Safety: safe-unsafe; just-unjust; kind-cruel; friendly-unfriendly; honest-
dishonest.
Qualification: trained-untrained; experienced-inexperienced; skilled-
unskilled; qualified-unqualified; informed-uninformed.
Dynamism: aggressive-meek; emphatic-hesitant; bold-timid; active-
passive; energetic-tired.
64
The implications of this finding for the doctrine of character evidence are neither
specific nor clear. However, in addition to its revelation about the complexity of
credibility, the study indicates that individuals react to a communicator in a very
broad emotional manner. Information about him produces either a generalized
negative or positive attitude. The audience either "likes" or "dislikes" him and
reacts to his communication accordingly.
65
The finding of the second study more specifically confirms this conclusion.
The study was designed to investigate the relationship between audience attitude
toward a communicator and perception of the content of his communication."
A single persuasive communication was prepared on a controversial public issue.
It was then presented to two separate audiences whose members had been in-
duced to form different impressions of the communicator (one positive and one
negative). The investigators sought to determine if credibility effects could be
explained in terms of a psychological theory known as cognitive balance. In
simple terms, this theory suggests that everything associated with a "liked" person
will be liked, that everything associated with a "disliked" person will be disliked,
and that if a discrepancy develops in this relationship, a perceiver will restore the
balance by misperceiving the situation." It was hypothesized that the theory
would function as follows in the area of communications:
There should be at least a tendency for the audience to perceive com-
munications as congruent with their attitude toward the communicator.
64 Id. at 574.
65 The precise nature of this reaction and the cause for it have been explained well in the
leading authoritative work on communications and persuasion:
1. Because of their unfavorable attitudes (toward the communicator), members
of the audience do not pay close attention to the content and/or do not attempt
to comprehend the exact meaning of what is said' The former could result from
thinking about the communicator, while the latter might result from "reading into"
the content various implications that correspond to the assumed intent of the com-
municator. As a result, they learn the material less well than when it is presented
by a favorable source and, failing to learn it, are unable to adhere to the recom-
mended conclusions.
2. Because of their unfavorable attitudes, members of the audience are not
motivated to accept or believe what the communicator says and recommends.
HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, supra note 54, at 37.
66 Kelman & Bagly, supra note 62.
67 Though greatly oversimplified, this theory is well described in the following statement:
According to Heider's (1958) theory of cognitive balance and related theoretical
formulations, there are strong forces to maintain similarity of affect toward another
person and toward the things that are associated with him-his actions, his posses-
sions, his friends. Thus, if P likes 0, he also tends to like what 0 does, or believes, or
owns; and if P dislikes 0, he also tends to dislike whatever is integrally linked with
0. If there is a discrepancy in affect-for example, P might like 0, but disapprove
of O's action-forces toward restoring a balanced configuration will come into play.
If the action is sufficiently ambiguous P may tend to misperceive it, thus removing
the disturbing incongruity.
Kelnan & Eagley, supra note 62, at 63.
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They should see the message of a negative communicator as more negative
than it actually is... and the message of a positive communicator as more
positive than it actually is.... To the extent that such displacements occur,
they can be expected to have significant effects on the amount of attitude
change that is produced. In the case of a negative communicator, mis-
perception of his message is likely to reduce even further his persuasive
impact; the further the listener displaces the communicator's position from
his own, the more likely he is to dismiss the communication as irrelevant and
outside of his range of acceptance."8
The results of the study confirmed this hypothesis. Though both audiences heard
the same communication, only the one induced to "dislike" the communicator
rejected its message. The investigators concluded that rejection by members of
the "negative" audience reflected "their general disapproval of this speaker and
everything he stands for, rather than disagreement with the specific content of
what he said.""9 Obviously this conclusion is totally consistent with the belief
that communication persuasiveness is tied to some extent to "irrelevant aspects of
credibility." It should also be obvious that an audience reaction such as that
revealed by this study, if occurring in a jury, would cause a distortion of testimony
and a consequent distortion of the decision process.
3. Conclusion
Scientific investigation has established with certainty that an individual's
acceptance and use of information are dependent partially upon his evaluation of
its source and that the evaluative variable commonly referred to as "credibility"
is multidimensional and complex. It has also established that a highly reliable
communication can be distorted or rejected because of an emotional reaction to
the communicator that generates "irrelevant" credibility factors.
None of the results of this investigation have specified how character evidence
might cause this kind of emotional reaction. Nonetheless, available scientific data
establish a clear and certain risk that irrelevant, and therefore undesirable, testi-
monial influences emanate from evidence about a witness's character. As the law
attempts to assess the positive and negative aspects of character doctrine, this
risk is one of the factors that need to be carefully weighed against the probative
value of character evidence.
C. Nontestimonial Influences of Character
1. Introduction
The psychological processes involved in interpersonal perception are obvi-
ously complex, for they represent the systems by which people respond to informa-
tion about and action by one another. It is now known that perceivers cannot
absorb and use every stimulus item confronted in social interaction. As one
researcher has stated, "the abiding fact... is that organisms have a highly limited
68 Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
69 Id; at 67.
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span of attention and a highly limited span of immediate memory" and, there-
fore, they are forced to select from their environment those things that are "some-
how essential to the enterprises in which [they] are engaged.""0 This part of the
article focuses on this process of selectivity as it functions in a criminal case in
relation to evidence of an accused's prior criminal activity. The principal objec-
tive is to evaluate the claim that the law's attempt at a restricted use of such
evidence is "a ritualistic counsel of psychologically impossible behavior,"'" by
asking whether jurors can receive information that a criminal defendant has
previously committed criminal acts and use that information exclusively to assess
his testimonial credibility.
2. Forming Impressions of Personality
The scientific study of interpersonal perception began about thirty years ago
with a series of experiments designed to discover how impressions of personality
are formed."2 This initial investigation has had immeasurable influence on per-
ception theory, and to this day it is regarded as a landmark in the area of psycho-
logical inquiry.73 One experiment from this series stands out in importance and
influence. 4
The experiment began by presenting the personal characteristics of a fictitious
person to two separate groups of subjects. The characteristics were portrayed by
the reading of a list of trait adjectives. The presentation to the separate groups
differed only with respect to one characteristic ("warm"-"cold") :
GROUP ONE: Intelligent - skillful - industrious - warm - determined
- practical - cautious.
GROUP TWO: Intelligent - skillful - industrious - cold - determined
- practical - cautious.
The purpose of the experiment was to observe methods by which subjects use
information to "understand" other people. Two techniques were utilized to
elicit the impressions that resulted. First, the subjects were asked to write brief
sketches of the person described to them by the adjective list. Then they were
presented with a checklist of other trait names and asked to select the ones con-
sidered most in accord with their impressions. Some of the additional traits had
a semantic similarity to the trait variable in the stimulus list; for example, "so-
ciable-unsociable," "popular-unpopular," and "humorous-humorless." Others
did not have such similarity; for example, "dishonest-honest," "imaginative-hard-
headed," and "humane-ruthless." 75
70 Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception, in RnADiNGs IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 86 (E.
Maccoby, T. Newcomb, & E. Hartley eds. 1958).
71 United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574, 576 (3d Cir. 1960).
72 Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORm. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 258 (1946).
73 See, e.g., Secord & Bercheid, Stereotyping and the Generality of Implicit Personality
Theory, 31 J. PERSONALITY 63 (1963); Veness & Brierley, Forming Impressions of Personality:
Two Experiments, 2 BRIT. J. Soc. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 11 (1963); Koltuv, Some Characteristics of
Intrajudge Trait Intercorrelations, 76 PSYCHOL. MONOGR. 1 '(1962); Bruner & Tagiuri, The
Perception of People, in 2 HANDBOOx OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 634 (G. Lindsey ed. 1954).




Through this procedure it was discovered that the two groups of subjects
formed significantly different impressions of the target person. Those formed by
members of group one were far more positive than those formed by group two and
these impressions carried through to "checklist" traits having no semantic
similarity to the trait variable. For example, the "warm" person was seen as
humane and imaginative, the "cold" one as ruthless and hardheaded."6 Far
more important, however, was a finding that the impressions formed, whether
positive or negative, were not fragmentary in nature but instead complete in
every way. The conclusion drawn from this finding about the general process of
person perception is especially relevant:
There is an attempt to form an impression of the entire person. The
subject can see the person only as a unit; he cannot form an impression of
one-half or of one-quarter of the person. This is the case even when the
factual basis is meager; the impression then strives to become complete,
reaching out toward other compatible qualities. The subject seeks to reach
the core of the person through the trait or traits.7
This was later stated more succinctly: Although a person "possesses many ten-
dencies, capacities, and interests, we form a view of one person, a view that
embraces his entire being or as much of it as is accessible to us. We bring his
many-sided, complex aspects into some definite relations."78s
The implications of this finding are definite and considerable. The results
of this study suggest that the law's expectation that jurors can and will use
evidence of a defendant's character exclusively to evaluate his credibility is naive
and unrealistic. Any doubt on this score would have to focus on features of this
experiment that distinguish it from the conditions under which impressions are
formed of a criminal defendant. There are some such features. The person
whose characteristics were being evaluated by use of the trait lists was fictitious.
In the criminal courtroom jurors react to a real person."9 In addition, the cir-
cumstances under which they receive information about that real person are
vastly different from the artificial conditions that prevailed in the experiment.
It is possible, therefore, that the conclusion drawn from this study-that person-
ality is perceived in terms of an integrated, unitary impression-might not be
transferable to the courtroom.
All of the scientific data developed since this early experiment point over-
whelmingly to a contrary conclusion. The finding of the original study stimulated
a comprehensive investigation of the processes involved in personality perception;
76 Id. at 263.
77 Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
78 S. Ascx, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 206 (1952).
79 The effect of this factor ("hypothetical" versus "real" target) on impression formation
has been of sufficient concern to psychologists to stimulate at least one direct study of its im-
portance. See Burron, Carlson, Getty, & Douglas, The Effects of Informational Characteristics
on the Perception of Real and Hypothetical Target Persons, 23 PsYCHONOMIO SCIENCE 145(1971). The conclusion drawn from that investigation was as follows:
There is a lingering doubt on the part of some research workers that laboratoryfindings based on "artificial" laboratory procedures may not be generalizable to reallife situations. While this possibility has not been unequivocally discounted, never-
theless, within limits, the reality of the target is not a crucial variable for personalityjudgments.
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the "theory of unified impressions" has been subjected to virtually every con-
ceivable empirical challenge. The original experiment has been duplicated scores
of times, each duplication containing a significant variation in the manner by
which information about the "target" person was presented for evaluation."0 In
every instance the experimental results have paralleled those of the first study.
Personality has been found consistently to be perceived in terms of unified,
integrated impressions. The existence of a tendency to structure images of others
as complete personalities is, therefore, no longer subject to doubt among psychol-
ogists.'I Consequently, it can be predicted with perfect confidence that informa-
tion about a defendant's character, including evidence of prior misconduct, will
be used by jurors to construct a complete, integrated image of his personality. It
appears certain that when the law requests jurors to give character evidence a
restricted use, it demands "a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only the
jury's power, but anybody else's." 2
A second experiment in the landmark series described above revealed that
in the perception process individual items of information about a person do not
have an evenly distributed impact on the total impression formed.8 3 The pro-
cedure used in that investigation was identical to the one used in the first experi-
ment, except that the trait variable was changed. "Polite-blunt" was substituted
for "warm-cold." When the results of the two experiments were compared it was
80 In one study, for example, an actual person was used in the experiment, with the stim-
ulus information (the adjective list involved in the original experiment) being presented in
the form of -a preconfrontation introduction of the target person. Kelley, The Warm-Cold
Variable in First Impressions of Persons, 18 J. PERSONALITY 431 (1950). In a series of experi-
ments, a fictitious person was the subject of evaluation but the adjective traits (again extracted
from the original study), rather than being presented as a list, were skillfully incorporated
into a narrative description of the person. P. WARR & C. KNAPPER, THE PERCEPTION OF
PEOPLE AND EVENTS 118 (1968). In another experiment a tape recording was used to present
the stimulus information, with the target person being the recording voice. The six constant
traits of the standard list were presented to the subjects without express mention of the trait
words, and the trait variable ("cold-warm") was presented in the form of tonal changes in
the recording voice. Veness & Brierley, supra note 73. For other studies of similar type see
Shapiro & Tagiuri, Some Effects of Response Control on Trait Impression, 26 J. PERSONALITY
42 (1958); Cofer & Dunn, Personality Ratings as Influenced by Verbal Stimuli, 21 J. PERSON-
ALiTY 223 (1952); Mensh & Wishner, Asch on "Forming Impressions of Personality," Further
Evidence, 16 J. PERSONALITY 188 (1947).
81 P. VERNON, PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL SURVEY 32-33 (1964):
But it should be stressed that the observer always tends to see the subject as a
unitary whole, however fragmentary the cues. He is not a sum of his physical, dynam-
ic and other qualities any more than a chair is perceived as an addition of certain
dimensions and colours. At first sight . . . he is an individual, and the information
about more detailed qualities which is obtained from subsequent cues is integrated
into this whole.
Ichheiser, Misunderstandings in Human Relations, 55 AM. J. SocloL. 27, 28 (1949) [herein-
after cited as Ichheiser]:
This, however, is not the way in which our social perception and its mechanisms
actually do operate. Rather, they function so as to transcend in many ways and
many directions the pure raw material and to construct out of this material a more
or less well-organized and integrated image of the given personality.
P. WARR & C. KNAPPER, THE PERCEPTION OF PEOPLE AND EVENTS 35 (1968):
We do not perceive an object as a simple aggregate of stimuli, but rather we
impose our own organization on the material .... Subjects who are given only a lim-
ited, incomplete set of information about a person (a list of characteristics or a photo-
graph) impose their own organization upon this material so that they form an impres-
sion of the person which is detailed, ordered and self-consistent.
82 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
83 Asch, supra note 72, at 266.
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found that the "polite-blunt" variable had a much weaker effect on the impres-
sions formed than the "warm-cold" variable. The experimenter concluded that
certain qualities of a person become "central" and others "peripheral" with
respect to their influence on an ultimate impression . 4 He explained: "We
usually distinguish between qualities that furnish the key to a person and those
that are subsidiary. By doing this we acknowledge that not all characteristics of
a person have the same weight." ' This finding poses an important question:
What degree of influence on the total impression of a defendant results from
introduction of evidence that he has previously engaged in criminal activity?
The discovery resulting from this second experiment has also been the
subject of considerable subsequent investigation. Some of the factors that
determine whether an item of information will be "central" or "peripheral" in
the formation of impressions have now been unraveled. Two factors possess
special relevance. The more significant of the two is suggested in the following
statement:
The choice we make among different possibilities in classifying an
individual in one particular way and not in another is motivated by two
factors: by the attitude of the person performing the classificatory act and
by the situation in which this act is being performed. However, as a rule,
the situation seems to be the dominant factor.""
From the very beginning of impression formation research the importance of
"context" in the perception process has been recognized. In the first study in-
volving use of the trait adjective lists the experimenter said that "the content and
functional value of a trait changes with the given context." Additional experi-
mentation of the same type has confirmed this conclusion. The specific setting
in which judgment about a person is made bears significantly upon the evalua-
tion of information about that person. The setting serves to sensitize the perceiver
to the importance of certain kinds of stimulus information.8
How might this factor influence the reaction of jurors to information that
an accused has committed criminal offenses other than the one charged? On the
basis of the experimental data, we know that "[t]he perceiver does not passively
assign equal priority to incoming cues, but actively seeks out information which
is relevant to his purposes in the situation of interaction. The perceiver is tuned
or set to process certain kinds of information but not others."8 We also have
reason to believe that jurors undertake their task already possessing certain gen-
eral knowledge about the defendant. They know that he was arrested by a police
84 Id. at 284.
85 S. Asch, supra note 78, at 208.
86 Ichheiser, supra note 81, at 34.
87 Aseh, supra note 72, at 285.
88 See, e.g., Wishner, Reanalysis of "Impressions of Personality," 67 PSYCHOL. REv. 96, 109(1960); Luchins, Forming Impressions of Personality: A Critique, 43 J. ABNoaM. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 318, 325 (1948); J. BIsi, A. ADxiNs, S. BRIAR, A. IEAMN, H. MILLER, & T.
TRIPODr, CLINICAL AN SOCIAL JUDGMENT: THE DISCRIMINATION OF BEHAVIORAL INFORMA-
TION 209 (1966); Tagiuri, Introduction, in PERSON PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BE-
"EAvIOR xiii-xiv (Tagiuri & Petrullo eds. 1958).
89 Jones & Thibaut, Interaction Goals as Bases of Inference in Interpersonal Perception, in
PERSON PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BnHAVIOR 153 (Tagiuri & Fetrullo eds. 1958).
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officer who believed him guilty of a crime, that preliminary proceedings were
held in which grounds were discovered for pursuing a formal charge, and that
an independent body of citizens acting as a grand jury handed down an indict-
ment. On top of this, of course, they realize that their ultimate responsibility is
to determine whether the defendant engaged in criminal behavior. In this
"setting" they are informed that he has previously engaged in behavior of a
similar kind. It is inconceivable that they could avoid entering the judgment-
m aking phase of the proceeding without expectations about the defendant which
serve to impose on the evidence of prior criminal behavior a prominent role in
the perception process. In other words, they are sensitized to respond to informa-
tion about a defendant's criminal behavior.
In every criminal case this "set" exists though its precise nature might vary.
The "context" effect could be expected to correlate to some extent with the
relationship between the offense charged and the offense underlying a prior
conviction. In a murder case the jurors' reaction to a prior theft conviction would
differ from their reaction to a prior murder conviction. With respect to both,
however, it seems certain that the stimulus information-the evidence about his
prior criminal activity-would play a "central" role in the impressions formed of
the defendant.
There is an additional basis supporting this conclusion. The research on
impression formation has identified a second factor determinative of the relative
impact of a given item of information on an impression: "When judging another
person we do not only classify him and make predictions about him; we also
respond to him in certain emotional ways. Indeed... this affective response is
of outstanding importance and one which enters strongly into every interpersonal
relationship."9 Thus one person's reaction to another is at least partly evaluative.
A judgment that a person possesses an unattractive attribute will result in a
general impression that fits within that judgmental framework. In an attempt to
flesh out their understanding of this feature of perception, psychologists have
found that unfavorable, unpleasant or socially derogatory information about
another person will have a greater impact on personality image than informa-
tion of equal intensity but of a positive dimension." As one writer has stated:
"[A] single negative trait is more prepotent than its opposite positive."92 Another
has said that "a number of studies of personality impression formation have
shown that negative traits have more influence on an impression response than
do positive traits.""3 Though research support is still rather incomplete, this con-
clusion provides an additional basis for predicting that, when forming a unitary
impression of a defendant's personality, jurors will be greatly influenced by
evidence of prior criminal behavior.
90 P. WAPR & C. KNAPP.R, supra note 80, at 16.
91 See, e.g., Schneider, Implicit Personality Theory: A Review, 79 PSYCHOL. BULL. 294,
299 (1973) ; Weinstein & Crowdus, The Effects of Positive and Negative Information on Person
Perception, 21 HpMA'N RELATIONS 383 (1968).
92 Koltuv, Some Characteristics of. Intrajudge Trait Intercorrelations, 76 PSYrOL.
MONOOR. 1, 3 (1962).
93 Levin, Wall, Dolezal, & Norman, Differential Weighting of Positive and Negative Traits




These perception studies leave little doubt that evidence of prior misconduct
places a defendant in a generalized unfavorable light with jurors. It can almost
be taken for granted that judgments on matters affecting the defendant, par-
ticularly the charge against him, will correlate highly with this unfavorable im-
pression. Wigmore had something like this in mind when he said that bad
character alone might "be thought by the jury to deserve punishment or to
deprive an erroneous verdict of its moral injustice."'" In other words, he assumed
that impressions of a defendant linked to evidence of bad character might distort
the decision-making process. This part of the article will focus more directly on
this prospect by use of scientific evaluations of personality misinterpretation.
In their investigation of perception, psychologists have identified several
psychic mechanisms that cause individuals to distort judgments about others. 5
A strong possibility exists that one of them could interact with evidence of a
defendant's misconduct so as to falsify the ultimate judgment of his guilt or in-
nocence. For lack of a better term, we will call this the error of oversimplification.
The tendency to oversimplify the personalities of others is generally ranked
at the top of the list of misinterpretative mechanisms. It has been recognized
by psychologists as an error of judgment "so persistent, and seemingly so un-
avoidable, that it should be constantly borne in mind."9 Evidence of a de-
fendant's character (specifically information about his prior criminal behavior)
might trigger this mechanism and thereby distort the decision process in two ways.
The first involves a universally recognized need to see others as consistent, simple
beings whose behavior in a given situation is readily predictable. A constant
perceptual error is an inevitable part of this need, labeled the "tendency to over-
estimate the unity of personality": "
[T]hey [i.e., processes of social perception] function so as to transcend
in many ways and many directions the pure raw material and to construct
out of this material a more or less well-organized and integrated image of
the given personality. This image construction is usually endowed in our
minds with only those alleged characteristics which promise to help us ex-
plain, as a manifestation of the underlying personality, the behavior with
which we are confronted. In other words, we have the tendency to consider
a partial structure of personality which happens to be visible to us as if this
partial structure were the total personality "itself."98
Earlier we described the inability of individuals to react to others except in terms
of a unified, integrated impression. The above statement emphasizes, however,
that the tendency to see others as a "unit" is Widely at variance with the unity of
personality that exists in fact.9
94 3A WIGoORE § 921.
95 See Ichheiser, supra note 81; VERNON, supraz note 81, at 36.
96 G. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY-A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 520 (1937) [herein-
after cited as ALLPORT].
97 Ichheiser, supra note 81, at 27.
98 Id. at 28.
99 Others have made the same point in clearer, more concise terms. See, e.g., Heider, Per-
ceiving the Other Person, in PERSON PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 25 (Tagiuri
& Petrullo eds. 1958); VERNON, supra note 81, at 36.
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This tendency can operate in a criminal case as a source of misinterpretation
in a way best described by the psychologist who first identified it. Describing its
impact on judgment, he used an illustration that has special and pointed applica-
tion to the problem under discussion:
A man is under suspicion of murder. During the investigation certain
definite abnormalities of his sexual behavior come to light, even though there
is no evidence that they are related in any way to the committed murder.
Again, the frequent reaction in many people, if verbalized, would read
something like this: "This man whose sexual life deviates so strangely from
the norm can also be expected to deviate from other social norms in any
other respect." 0 0
This reaction is known in psychology as the "halo effect"-"one outstanding
'good' or 'bad' quality in a person casts its reflection upon all judgments pertain-
ing to him."'' It results from the failure to understand and discriminate between
the diverse behaviors of the person perceived.? 2 The effect of this psychological
process on evidence of an accused's prior criminal activity should be apparent.
The immediate impact of such information would be an inference to a personality
trait rated low on an evaluative dimension. A secondary impact would be the
rejection of any substantial possibility that in this same individual there could
also reside a personality trait rated high. The combined effect would be a gen-
eralized tendency in jurors to react toward the accused in a negative fashion.
The second way evidence about an accused's prior misconduct might
trigger the misinterpretative mechanism of oversimplification is revealed in this
statement: "We all have in everyday life the tendency to interpret and to evaluate
the behavior of other people in terms of specific personality characteristics rather
than in terms of specific social situations in which those people are placed."'0 3
An earlier part of this discussion described the way in which individuals use
a particular instance of conduct by another to impute to that person a broad,
enduring trait of personality. One consequence of that process is a distortion in
interpersonal perception. This has been called a "tendency to overestimate the
role of personal and to underestimate the role of situational factors."'0 4 Like
the tendency described in the preceding paragraph, this one has received wide-
spread recognition by psychologists.' It is predictable, therefore, that when
jurors receive information about prior criminal acts of an accused they impute
to him a dispositional quality and give inadequate attention to the possibility of
situationally .oriented explanations for his conduct.
100 Ichheiser, supra note 81, at 27-28.
101 ALLPORT, supra note 96, 521. Accord, Gage & Cronbach, Conceptual and Methodologi-
cal Problems in Interpersonal Perception, 62 PSYCHOL. REV. 411, 420 (1955); Thorndike, A
Constant Error in Psychological Ratings, 4 J. App. PSYCHOL. 25 '(1920).
102 WARR & KNAPPER, supra note 80, at 147: "A desirable attribute is assumed to imply
the possession of other desirable attributes" and "an undesirable attribute is assumed to imply
the possession of other undesirable attributes."
103 Ichheiser, supra note 81, at 46-47.
104 Id. at 46.
105 See Alexander & Epstein, Problems of Dispositional Inference in Person Perception Re-
search, 32 SociOMTaY 381, 384 (1969); W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND AssESSMENT 41-58
(1968) [hereinafter cited as MiscHEL].
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What kind of overall impact on the decision-making process of criminal
trials might be expected to flow from the combined operation of these two
tendencies? As has been stressed, there is no question about the existence in our
culture of a commonly held belief that human behavior is guided by dispositions
internal to the individual. Likewise, there is no doubt that consistency in be-
havior from one situation to another is thought to be a certain consequence of
these dispositions. As stated elsewhere, "mutual expectations of a considerable
degree .of constancy, stability, and continuity of personalities in the dimensions
of time are among the basic presuppositions of an orderly organization of human
relations.""' The predictable operation of these psychological processes in rela-
tion to evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts can best be revealed by .once
again using a quotation from a recognized work on interpersonal perception:
Sometimes the perception of a single behavioral consequence may be
decisive for the way in which important traits in a person's character mani-
fest themselves to us, especially when the relevant product deviates from
what we perceive as the typical product .... If a man has committed a
crime, many will perceive his personality in terms of this one behavior con-
sequence. To many people, a murderer is a murderer and nothing else.
They see in him only the abstract characteristic of being a murderer; and
this single characteristic swallows up all the rest of the human nature... *107
Can jurors receive information indicating that an accused has previously engaged
in criminal activity and use that information exclusively in the assessment of his
testimonial trustworthiness? This section started with that inquiry. A more direct
and certain answer to it from a scientific perspective than that contained in the
above quotation cannot be provided. There can be no more positive warning of
the need for a thoughtful appraisal of the probative worth of character evidence.
IV. Scientific Appraisals of Personality
A. Introduction
As applied to testimonial credibility, the law of character evidence, whether
traditional doctrine or the more "enlightened" federal rules, rests upon a funda-
mental assumption that the mental organization of every individual embodies a
predisposition toward truthful or untruthful behavior. The law believes this
mental quality to be more than a mere label for describing consistent patterns
of conduct. It is a psychic force existing independent of the observable behavior
in which it is manifested. It is considered a stable entity as much a part of a
person as his skin color, body structure, or intelligence: one that provides the
energy and direction by which he adapts himself to his environment.
The principal purpose of this section is to examine the validity of this as-
sumption in light of scientific appraisals of personality. The discussion will focus
on a body .of psychological data entirely different in orientation from that con-
106 Ichheiser, supra note 81, at 44.
107 F. FROM, PERCEPTION Or OTHER PEOPLE 46 (1971) (emphasis added).
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sidered in the preceding part of this article. The concern there was with the
perception or "image" of personality; here the concern will be with personality
itself. More specifically, we will inquire whether the structure of personality
consists of "traits" or "dispositions," as conceived by the law, or whether it obeys
principles of organization significantly different in character. By asking these
questions, we can formulate some judgments concerning the reliability of char-
acter evidence as a predictor of testimonial behavior.
B. Theoretical Explanations of Behavior
At about the time that Wignore's classic work achieved its massive influence
on the law, Gordon Allport, a scholar of equal status in the field of psychology,
published a treatise"' that shortly thereafter exerted equivalent influence on
scientific interpretations of personality. Some interesting and significant parallels
are contained in the two works. Wigmore's expressions on character reflected
then prevailing legal views. Allport reflected then prevailing scientific views
about character. More importantly, and quite contrary to Wigmore's belief," 9
the underlying assumptions of both disciplines (at least as reflected by these
scholarly works) about the nature of character were not substantially different.
Both viewed "character" as a useful and reliable predictor of behavior, and both
assumed that behavior of most people would be generally consistent across widely
divergent situations.
To explain this consistency, Allport postulated that individuals develop
stable elements of personality that exert determinative influence on behavior."'
These elements were called "traits" and were considered the peculiar qualities of
a person that distinguished him from all others. The language used to describe
them could easily be substituted for the law's definition of character traits.'
Psychologists generally agreed that traits were psychological entities that existed
in some real form; and therefore that they represented more than semantical
descriptions of consistent behavior.
The theoretical interpretation of behavior tied to the trait construct was
described in different ways since its inception, but was probably best known as
the theory of generality. Fundamentally, this theory contemplated that disposi-
tions internal to the individual cause environment adjustment in one situation to
correspond in a meaningful fashion to adjustments in other independent though
similar situations."' As a consequence, human behavior was expected to show
108 ALLPORT, supra note 96.
109 WIrmoRo § 922.
110 Mischel, supra note 105, at 1-39.
Ill "A trait is any distinguishable, relatively enduring way in which one individual differs
from others." J. GUILFORD, PERSONALITY 6 '(1959). "Traits are not creations in the mind
of observers, nor are they verbal fictions; they are here accepted as biophysical facts, actual
psychophysical dispositions. . . ." ALLPORT, supra note 96, at 339. "Traits are regarded as
personal dispositions, overlapping one another in structure and in function, but nonetheless
possessed of focal characteristics.... Traits may originate through integration of many similar
specific habits of adjustment, but with time the organization takes upon itself a generalized
character. . . ." Allport & Odbert, Trait Names: A Psycho-lexical Study, 47 PSYCHOL.
MONOGR. (No. 211, 1936).
112 ALLPORT, supra note 96, at 286; H. EYSENCK, THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN PERSONALrTY
1 (1970); GUILFORD, supra note 111, at 16.
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a high degree of cross-situational consistency and stability."1 3 When tied to the
type of behavior relevant to the present discussion the theory of generality was
explained in this way:
The unidimensional approach holds that a person is, or strongly tends
to be, consistent in his behavior over many different kinds of situations.
Thus a person who lies in one situation is not only likely to lie in other
situations, but is also highly likely to cheat, steal, not feel quilty, and so
on.1 4
From this statement it should be obvious that the law's conception and use of
character as a basis for predicting testimonial behavior are not significantly dif-
ferent from the psychological theory of generality. With both, traits are the basic
elements of personality and are considered to exert a generalized determining
influence on social behavior.
This conceptualization of the psychic structure dominated psychological
thought for many years. As one writer has recently put it, "the psychology of
personality was dominated for a long time by reifying intrapsychic traits as the
explanations of behavior." ' During this period enormous research was under-
taken to discover, measure, and make practical use of traits for behavioral pre-
diction. The total product of this effort contained two surprising developments
for personality theorists. One was the discovery of substantial evidence totally
inconsistent with the notion of generality. In a comprehensive study of decep-
tion, for example, researchers found very little consistency of behavior from one
situation to another.1 1 6 And a study of aggressive behavior in boy' 17 discovered
that "parents who punished aggression in the home, but who simultaneously
modeled aggressive behavior and encouraged it in their sons' peer relationships,
produced boys who were nonaggressive at home but markedly aggressive at
school.""'  As a consequence of these and similar findings there arose substantial
doubt about the trait explanation of personality. That doubt was magnified
by a second development. Researchers repeatedly failed to verify empirically
the existence of personal dispositions or even that behavior was consistent across
different situations. This produced general dissatisfaction with the theory of
generality."19
113 H. EYsENcx, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 9 (1964):
When we postulate a trait of sociability, we mean essentially that if we took a
hundred people and put them into ten different situations, all of which were relevant
to our notion of sociability, that the person who tended to be sociable in one situation
would also tend to be sociable in the others, whereas a person who was unsociable in
one would tend to be unsociable in the others also. In other words, his conduct would
show a certain degree of consistency.
114 Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOL. R.Ev. 481, 482 (1963).
115 Bowers, Situationism in Psychology: An Analysis and a Critique, 80 PsycHOL. RyV.
307, 325 (1973).
116 See H. HARsnoRN & M. MAY, 1 STUnIs IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTR-STUDIES
IN DECEIT (1928).
117 Bandura, Relationship of Family Patterns to Child Behavior Disorders, PROoRESS
REP RT, US.P.H. RESEARCH GRANT M-1734 (Stanford University, 1960).
118 MisaxL, supra note 105, at 28.
119 It was stated mildly by some, for example: "The results of trait-state assessments .. ,
lead to clear conclusions. . . . [HMighly generalized behavioral consistencies have not been
demonstrated, and the concept of personality traits as broad response predispositions is thus
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But accepting that the trait theory had failed posed enormous difficulties.
Psychologists naturally assumed that human personality consists of generalized
dispositions. As one psychologist stated, the theory is "logical, inherently plau-
sible, and also consistent with common sense and intuitive impressions about
personality."' 20 Without experimental data to support it and much to contradict
it, however, "the influence of trait theory as a viable model of man has dwin-
dled."'' The rejection of trait theory, virtually complete, has taken two forms.
One involves a total rejection .of the idea of personality "traits" and the
formulation of an entirely different explanation of behavior. Known best as the
theory of specificity, it emphasizes the situational determinants of behavior and
postulates that an individual's conduct in a given situation is largely controlled
by the circumstances under which it occurs:122
First, behavior depends on stimulus situations and is specific to the
situation: response patterns even in highly similar situations often fail to be
strongly related. Individuals show far less cross-situational consistency in
their behavior than has been assumed by trait-state theories. The more dis-
similar the evoking situations, the less likely they are to lead to similar or
consistent responses from the same individual. Even seemingly trivial situa-
tional differences may reduce correlations to zero.122
Thus it would appear extremely difficult to predict behavior on the basis of
past conduct. Similar difficulty occurs when the theory is tied to the type of be-
havior relevant to testimonial credibility:
i The doctrine of specificity of moral behavior holds that a person acts
in each situation according to the way he has been taught to act under
these particular conditions. The predictability of one's moral behavior from
one situation to another depends on the number of identical elements
which the two settings share. This formulation does not accept the abstract
concept of "honesty" as a valid character trait, but instead argues that there
are many different kinds of specific behaviors which tend to be independent
even though they may be included under the same rubric. 2 4
From this statement it is obvious that the theory of specificity is totally incon-
sistent with the law's conception of character and with its use of character evi-
dence as a basis for predicting testimonial behavior.
untenable." Id. at 146. Other theorists have expressed themselves more strongly. D. PETERSON,
TiE CLINICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 23 (1968):
The findings required abandonment of a line of research to which I had devoted
ten years of my life as a psychologist. The results also required a change in beliefs
about the nature of personality. This research, per se, did not say which way the
conceptual shift should go, but it suggested very strongly that traditional conceptions
of personality as internal behavior dispositions were inadequate and insufficient.
VERNON, supra note 81, at 239:
To the writer, the real argument against the trait . . . approach is not that it is
a bad theory; its weaknesses are recognized, and we cannot do without some form of
"intervening variables." The real trouble is that it has not worked well enough and,
despite the huge volume of research it has stimulated, it seems to lead to a dead end.
120 MIScHEL, supra note 105, at 147.
121 Bowers, supra note 115, at 307.
122 See generally Bowers, supra note 115; EYSENCK, supra note 112, at 3; EYsENcK, swrPra
note 13, at 4.
123 itscHiEL, supra note 105, at 177.
124 Burton, supra note 114, at 482.
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Other personality theorists have moved away from trait theory in a way
not quite so radical. They believe that behavior is far less general than originally
conceived,"2" but not as disintegrated and unpredictable as claimed by those
who adhere to the theory of specificity. Basically, the less radical psychologists
propose a modified trait theory: the behavioral response of an individual in a
given instance is thought to be determined by an interaction between his "psychic
structure" and the "situation."1 To some extent, the degree of modification
represented in this more modem view can be revealed by a recent statement by
Allport, the father of original trait theory;
[My earlier views seemed to neglect the variability induced by ecologi-
cal, social, and situational factors. This oversight needs to be repaired
through an adequate theory that will relate the inside [the psychic structure]
and outside [situational factors] systems more accurately.127
This statement reveals that the theory of behavior that was so compatible with
the law's notions about character has ceased to have any scientific recognition.
C. Experimental Studies of Deception
A significant part of the investigation from which the above theories were
derived was directed toward an appraisal of tendencies of individuals toward
moral or immoral behavior. It resulted in the discovery of "positive but small cor-
relations between moral conduct in one situation and moral conduct in another
situation."' 28 To show this it would be helpful to consider in detail the dominant
research effort in this area of personality study. Its application to the present
discussion is so direct and so obvious that any attempt to use psychological data
to reflect on the legal doctrine of character evidence inevitably leads to its find-
ings.
Known in psychology as the "character education inquiry,' 2 9 this investi-
gation started with the stated objective of obtaining "a complete picture of a
person's tendencies to deceive."'3 ° It was conducted for five years at Harvard
University by three American psychologists, and studied the tendencies toward
deception of 11,000 subjects. It has been appropriately described as "the largest
experimental project ever carried out in the field of personality,"'' and exerts a
125 Ailport, Traits Revisited, 21 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 2 (1966).
126 See, e.g., Nelsen, Grinder, & Mutterer, Sources of Variance in Behavioral Measures of
Honesty in Temptation Situations: Methodological Analyses, 1 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
265 (1969); Wallace, What Units Shall We Employ? Allport's Question Revisited, 31 J.
CONSULT. PSYCHOL. 56 (1967); Bowers, supra note 115; BYSENCK, supra note 113, at 17;
Guilford, supra note 111, at 16.
127 ALLPORT, supra note 125, at 9.
128 R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 408 (1965).
129 A complete description of this study in all its detail and with all its results can be found
in the following sources: H. HARTSHORNE & M. MAY, 1 STUDIES IN THE NATURE op CHAR-
ACTER-STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928); H. HARTSHORNE, M. MAY & F. SHUTTLEWORT3, STUDIES
IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CHARACTER (1930); H. HARTSHORNE, CHARACTER I HUMAN
RELATIONS (1932).
130 HARTSHORNE & MAY, supra note 129, at 14.
131 EYSENCK, supra note 112, at 227.
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yet unequalled influence on theoretical interpretations of behavior." 2 The prin-
cipal focus of this impressive investigation was to evaluate the part of human
character that has unquestionable relevance to testimonial credibility-"the
moral disposition which tends for or against falsehood."
The full implications of this investigation for the doctrine of character evi-
dence cannot be appreciated without a brief description of the methods used to
uncover the true nature of "deception." Twenty-nine different tests were used. 3'
Each involved a natural but controlled situation in which all subjects were
assured equal opportunity to deceive. The tests were administered under cir-
cumstances that created an illusion that lying, cheating or stealing could be
practiced without fear of detection. The techniques used by the experimenters
to investigate cheating are exemplified in their most frequently used test:
In this method, the children are tested twice on alternate versions of a
given test; on one occasion, conditions permit deception, on the other there
is strict supervision and no opportunity to deceive. The difference between
scores made on the two occasions is a rough measure of the tendency to
deceive, i.e., either to copy answers from the key or to change answers to
match the key.134
With its adaptability to multiple settings (classroom assignments, homework,
athletic contests, etc.), this technique was used to measure deception in a wide
variety of situations. It offered an opportunity for a clear measurement of the
consistency or inconsistency of such behavior. The method used to measure
lying was described as follows: "Lying could be detected . . . by asking the
children whether they had cheated on any of the tests. It was known, of course,
whether they had cheated or not; and if they denied having done so, the lie was
apparent."' 35 In combination, the methods used in the investigation provided a
unique and reliable opportunity to examine the true nature and quality of decep-
tive behavior.
The psychologists who conducted this study started their effort with notions
about human personality not very different from those presently held by lawyers.
It was thought to consist of generalized mental dispositions that influence be-
havior in a broad sense. Naturally, honesty was thought to be an important,
identifiable trait of character. So the experimenters expected the distribution of
deception scores on their tests to be bimodal in nature: "At one end of the
scale we would have a piling up of saints and at the other sinners, with nothing
much in between."' 36 Nothing less could be expected if honesty were a unified
trait providing the direction for individual adjustment to social situations.
The results of the investigation surprised the experimenters and shocked
the world of psychology:
132 For comments on this study, see e.g., EYSENCK, supra note 113, at 8; G. ALLPORT,
PATTERN AND GROWTH IN PERSONALITY 315 (1961); BROwN, supra note 128, at 402; Burton,
supra note 114, at 481; MISCHEL supra note 105, at 23; ALLPORT, supra note 96, at 250.
133 HARTSHORNE & MAY, supra note 129, at 14.
134 EYSENCK, supra note 113, at 10-11.
135 Id. at 11.
136 HARTSHORNE, supra note 129, at 210.
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What we actually observe is that the honesty or dishonesty of a child
in one situation is related to his honesty or dishonesty in another situation
mainly to the degree that the situations have factors in common. For ex-
ample, a child may cheat on his arithmetic test and ten minutes later, in
the same room, under the same examiner, under the same general conditions,
be perfectly honest in a spelling test. In like manner, he may be dishonest
in all the classroom situations but be perfectly honest in his dealings with
his fellow pupils on the playground or at party games. Indeed, the most
striking thing about the conduct of school children is the amount of incon-
sistency exhibited. If we call perfect consistency one hundred and perfect
inconsistency zero, the average consistency score .. . is only twenty, and
there are a great many more between twenty and zero, than there are be-
tween twenty and one hundred. The average child is no better integrated
in terms of an ethical ideal than if he had never heard of it. 3 7
This finding delivered a crushing blow to the common belief that most people
are "consistent and simple beings, who stay the same in different surroundings
or at different times" ;"' and suggested instead that the characteristics we see in
other people may be in large measure illusory or that, as one theorist stated,
"behavioral consistencies . ..are constructed by observers, rather than actual
consistency in the subject's behavior."' 39
As important as these results are, the conclusion which the experimenters
drew is even more important:
The results of these studies show that neither deceit nor its opposite,
"honesty," are unified character traits, but rather specific functions of life
situations.. . . Lying, cheating, and stealing as measured by the test situ-
ations used in these studies are only very loosely related.' *0
We found that, when situations involving the possibility of deception
were almost identical, the behavior of individuals did not greatly vary from
occasion to occasion. But when the situations permitting dishonesty were
altered, as when one moves from a classroom to a party or an athletic con-
test or has the opportunity to steal money rather than to copy the answers
of a test from an answer sheet, then there was found greater and greater
diversity of behavior, so that one could not predict from what a person did
in one situation what he would do in a different situation.'4'
This conclusion has been called the "doctrine of specificity." Put in simpler
terms, it means that dishonesty and falsehood (and presumably the entire range
of deviant behavior) tend to be "unintegrated, unstable and unpredictable."' 42
In short "no one is honest or dishonest by 'nature' "; "honesty is simply a
name used to describe conduct as observed in specific situations."' 44
137 Id. at 209.
138 VERN ON, supra note 81, at 36.
139 MscrEL, supra note 105, at 43.
140 HAI TSEORNE & MAY, supra note 129, at 411.
141 HARTSHORNE, MAY & SHUTTLVWORTH, supra note 129, at 1.
142 EysENcx, supra note 113, at 15.
143 HARTsnoRNE & MAY, supra note 129, at 412.
144 IARTSnoRN, supra note 129, at 210.
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D. Implications for Character Doctrine
1. Introduction
These data have clear implications for the law of character evidence. Some
serve only to confirm suspicions held by lawyers and, therefore, probably possess
a significant degree of acceptability. For example, the data most certainly reveal
that the probative worth of character evidence is very low. Others, perhaps the
major ones, will be enormously controversial. The notion of specificity in moral
behavior radically challenges the law's most basic assumption about human
personality, the one upon which all principles of character evidence are con-
structed. The law believes that individuals possess broad traits of character,
internal dispositions that direct the manner in which people adapt themselves to
their environment. If this belief conflicts with scientific fact, as the doctrine of
specificity indicates, the law of character evidence cannot withstand scientific
scrutiny. There is another equally undeniable fact. Underlying the doctrine of
specificity is the belief that moral behavior is largely determined by circumstances
external to the human "character." This belief also challenges a fundamental
legal assumption. The law is firmly committed and accustomed to classifying
people in terms of traits. Consequently, nothing could be more unrealistic than
to expect that the doctrine of character evidence will suddenly collapse. It is
reasonable only to expect a capacity for change on a smaller scale, to expect
that some elemental parts of the doctrine are still malleable. The following dis-
cussion focuses on two such parts.
2. Evidence of General Moral Character
As described in the first part of this article, two features of character have
been judged relevant to testimonial credibility-"veracity" and "general moral
character." The relevancy of the latter is reflected in two principles: admissi-
bility of community reputation for general moral character (recognized in but
few jurisdictions) and impeachment by use of any felony conviction (followed
by a majority of jurisdictions). Underlying this judgment is an assumption that
a person's moral qualities are highly integrated and motivate transsituational con-
sistency of moral behavior. The soundness of this assumption has been radically
undercut by the scientific studies described above. But the total incompatibility
of the legal assumption with scientific interpretations of personality has not been
revealed. No modern psychologist would consider moral behavior so integrated.
Abundant evidence to support this conclusion can be found in the scientific
literature. The studies of "honesty," described above, and other investigations of
moral behavior have generated a universal viewpoint about the integration of
moral conduct by psychologists. Psychologists uniformly agree that moral judg-
ments made by a single individual are independent of one another and affected
substantially by the particulars of each situation."4 5 If this personality character-
145 MISCHEL, supra note 105, at 179:
Or take the area of moral behavior and resistance to temptation. When the
probable reinforcing consequences for cheating differ widely across situations--depen-
ding on the particular task and circumstances, the behavior of others, the likelihood
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istic is ignored, as the law continues to do, the task of predicting behavior on the
basis of some index of general character is reduced to something worse than a
mere guess. The truth of this assertion is confirmed by the following statement
of a noted English psychologist, made after he had reviewed al of the scientific
data on moral behavior:
The only thing that all "morally relevant" behaviors have in common
is the attribution to them of the words good, bad, right or wrong by those
who look on.... Of course to a certain extent the adult who is extremely
aware of the moral-immoral distinction may make a self-conscious attempt
to be consistently moral, but the real point is that there is not a personality
trait which defines that a person who finds resistance to temptation easy
in situation A will also find it easy in situation B-Z, in short that people
tend to be generally "moral" or generally "immoral."
The major finding, that morality is a blanket term effectively useless
for the scientific analysis of personality is as important as it is difficult to
accept. The fact that the morally good-morally bad division is the central
one in the layman's assessment of personality means that, on the face of it,
people rate other people primarily on a dimension that doesn't mean much.
To the extent that "'overall morality" of a person is a basis on which to rate
him, to that extent the rating is inexact. Clearly, the situation is not as
simple as this. . 146
This statement clearly reveals the direction in which the law would have to move
to bring its character rules into line with this particular scientific viewpoint.
3. Evidence of Criminal Convictions
The rule that authorizes the use of criminal convictions for purposes of im-
peachment possesses the greatest potential for distorting the decision process.
The rule is based on a belief that a trait of character may reliably be evidenced
by a single particular act of conduct:
Thus, whenever resort is had to a person's past conduct or acts as the
basis of inference to a subsequent act, it must always be done intermediately
through another inference.... The impulse to argue from A's former bad
of detection, the probable consequences of being caught, the value of success, and so
forth-impressive generality in moral conduct is not to be found.
BROWN, supra note 128, at 410:
The evidence for specificity in the moral domain casts general doubt on the
simplistic view that adults share a morality which parents introduce to the child which
the child incorporates, as given, in all its dimensions. The evidence for specificity
causes us to entertain some very different ideas. Perhaps there is no morality shared
by all members of a society. Perhaps the morality parents bring is made up of many
distinct learning problems. Perhaps the child's progress on these problems is uneven.
Allinsmith, The Learning of Moral Standards, in INNER CONFLICT AND DEFENSE 164 (Miller
and Swanson eds. 1960):
A person may have very severe internalized prohibitions of stealing, but mild
prohibitions of disobedience, or his severity may be high for disobedience and low for
aggression. This interpretation is bolstered by our finding that our subjects' scores on
intensity of guilt in one moral area are not significantly related to their scores in any
other moral areas. The person with a generally severe conscience, then, may be
rarer than has been thought. Judging from our data, the person with a truly general-
ized conscience... is a statistical rarity.




deed or good deed directly to his doing or not doing of the bad deed charged
is perhaps a natural one; but it will always be found, upon analysis of the
process of reasoning, that there is involved in it a hidden intermediary step
of some sort, resting on a second inference of character.... This interme-
diate step is always implicit, and must be brought out. 4 7
The inquiry Wigmore's statement suggests should be apparent: Is it scientifically
defensible to deduce a behavioral tendency-a so-called trait of character-from
a single observable act of behavior?
Once again the scientific data described above generally indicate the law's
irrationality. This data, however, does not adequately indicate the degree to which
law and science conflict on this point. Obviously, psychologists adhering to the
notion of specificity consider a prediction of behavior on the basis of a single act
unsound. As a matter of fact, most would probably consider it an exercise in
nonsense. As one theorist stated, "the assessor who tries to predict the future
without detailed information about the exact environmental conditions influenc-
ing the individual's criterion behavior may be more engaged in the process of
hoping than of predicting."' 48 The most significant scientific revelations on this
issue, however, were made by the old trait theorists.
The key to prediction of behavior under this outmoded theory of personality
was the discovery of "traits." Without exception those who supported this theory
believed that man's true character-his so-called traits---could only be discovered
by observing his conduct over a lengthy period of time.'49 They left no room
for inference of a trait from a single act of behavior. There had to be consistent
observable acts of behavior or, as one writer stated, "a succession of specific
adaptive acts that follow one another in close array."' 50
If any doubt exists about the trait theorists' reaction to the law's use of a
criminal conviction to prove a character trait, it should be removed by the fol-
lowing statement made by the leading proponent of that theory after listing three
indicators of a particular trait:
Three indicators, of course, are not enough. Although all might point
to a trait of seclusiveness, they might also be accounted for in terms of John's
busyness or a temporary mood. But when we have not three, but scores,
hundreds, or even thousands of acts that show a dependable regularity and
consistency, we feel on a firmer ground in saying that John must be a seclu-
sive sort of chap.'5 '
147 1 J. WrMOICRE, EVIDENCE § 192 (3d ed. 1940).
148 MISCHEL, supra note 105, 140.
149 EYSENCKC, supra note 112, at 9-10:
It will be clear from these quotations that the notion of trait is intimately con-
nected with the notion of correlation. Stability, consistency, repeated occurrence of
action-all these terms, when translated into more rigorous and operationally definable
language, refer to co-variation of a number of behavioural acts. . . . A trait may
be defined as a co-variant set of behavioural acts; it appears thus as an organizing
principle which is deduced from the observed generality of human behavior.
ALLPORT, supra note 96, at 314:
Traits, then are discovered not by deductive reasoning, not by fiat, not by naming,
and are themselves never directly observed. They are discovered in the individual
life-the only place where they can be discovered-only through an inference (or
interpretation) made necessary by the demonstrable consistency of the separate
observable acts of behavior.
150 ALLPORT, supra note 96, at 313.
151 Id. at 337.
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When one considers that these viewpoints existed before trait theory fell into
disrepute and before trait psychologists acknowledged the paramount importance
of situational factors, it is beyond question that "any constructive understanding
of character must rest on a knowledge of diverse actions and behavior."' 52
V. Conclusion
The discussion in this article has had a modest purpose, which can best be
suggested by reference to scientific studies having almost nothing to do with
character evidence. They involve investigation of human behavior that only a
most inquisitive mind would undertake. In the first an ordinary coin is flipped
in the presence of a- subject and he is requested to call out "heads" or "tails."
The exercise is repeated with a large sample of subjects. Any reasonably intel-
ligent person can predict the distribution of responses. With no recognizable
basis for making a choice, 50 percent of the subjects would call out "heads"
and 50 percent would call out "tails." In a second study, a large group of peo-
ple acting individually is requested to choose a number from the list 1, 2, 3 and
4. Then the same people are subsequently asked to select a letter from the list
A, B, C, and D. Again with no discernible basis for choosing one option over
any other (and assuming of course a sufficiently large sample of subjects), the
distribution of responses is readily predictable-25 percent for each letter and
each number. Common sense and intuitive judgment, the same intellectual base
underneath the law's character rules, enable us to make these simple decisions
about the behavior of people.
To expose and emphasize the risk involved in making judgments about
human behavior from this kind of intellectual base has been the goal of this
writing. The results of these two investigations do that exceedingly well. For
some yet inexplicable reason, approximately 80 percent of a group of people
confronted with a coin toss will call out "heads."'5 3 Similarly, 60 percent of a
group confronted with a list of numbers like that described above will select "3"
and about the same percentage will select "B" from the list of letters.' Several
important messages are conveyed by the results of these apparently trifling investi-
gations. They reveal a complexity of individual behavior that can be anticipated
only by someone more aware of psychological phenomena than lawyers can pos-
sibly be. They demonstrate vividly that sensible but naive judgments about
human conduct can be permeated by critical elements of misinterpretation. But
above all, they serve as a simple reminder that no person can know until he
first knows that he knows not. A realization that understanding does not exist
is a prerequisite to achieving understanding. The discussion in this article has
been an effort to provide that prerequisite with respect to "character and credi-
bility." It has been an attempt to move the law closer to truth by exposing its
lack of knowledge about the true nature of human character and about the true
nature of the perception of character.
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